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I.  IMPLEMENTATION OF MONETARY POLICY IN 2004 
A.  Introduction 
The Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) domestic policy directive prescribes that the Trading Desk 
(Desk) of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) foster conditions in the reserves market 
consistent with maintaining the federal funds rate around a specified target rate on average.  Accordingly, 
the Desk arranges open market operations to target the federal funds rate, while at the same time achieving 
other objectives that may affect the structure of Federal Reserve holdings of domestic financial assets. 
 
This report reviews the conduct of open market operations during 2004.  First, we review operating 
procedures used by the Desk to influence the federal funds rate and summarize key new developments in 
the policy implementation framework.  Next, we describe demand for balances at the Federal Reserve and 
the behavior of autonomous factors (factors outside of the control of the Desk) that affect the supply of 
these balances.  Then, we review different domestic financial assets held by the Federal Reserve and the 
various types of open market operations used to adjust them.  Finally, we discuss the behavior of the 
federal funds rate and use of the discount window in 2004. 
 
B.  Overview of Operational Procedures to Control the Federal Funds Rate 
The federal funds target rate was increased on five occasions in 2004, from 1 percent to 2 ¼ percent (Table 
1).  In related moves, the primary and secondary credit rates were also raised by similar amounts to 3 ¼ and 
3 ¾ percent, respectively.  The first of these moves took place in June.  
 
Table 1: Changes to the Federal Funds Target Rate and Borrowing Rates
(Percent)
Effective Date of Change
Federal Funds Target 
Rate
Primary Credit Rate Secondary Credit Rate
June 30, 2004 1.25 2.25 2.75
August 10, 2004 1.50 2.50 3.00
September 21, 2004 1.75 2.75 3.25
November 10, 2004 2.00 3.00 3.50
December 14, 2004 2.25 3.25 3.75  




To influence the federal funds rate, the Desk conducts open market operations to align the supply of 
balances held by depository institutions at the Federal Reserve—or Fed balances—with banks’ demand to 
hold balances at the target rate.  Each morning, the Desk considers the need for open market operations 
based on estimates of the supply of and demand for Fed balances.  The Desk aims to supply a level of Fed 
balances that is in line with its best estimate of demand.  From time to time, the Desk’s provision of Fed 
balances may be guided by a deviation of the federal funds rate in the morning from its target rate.  
 
The average level of Fed balances that banks demand over a two-week reserve maintenance period is in 
large part determined by banks’ requirements to hold Fed balances, with only a small level of additional, or 
excess, balances typically demanded.  The federal funds rate can move above the target rate if Fed balances 
fall so low that some banks have difficulty finding sufficient funds to cover required balance deficiencies or 
potential overdrafts in their Fed accounts.  Conversely, the federal funds rate can fall below the target rate 
if Fed balances are so high that some banks risk ending a maintenance period holding undesired excess 
balances.  However, depository institutions average their holdings of Fed balances over the days within a 
maintenance period to meet requirements, which gives them considerable leeway in day-to-day account 
management.  This flexibility absorbs some volatility in rates that can develop when the Desk misestimates 
either the supply of or demand for Fed balances.   
 
C.  New Developments in 2004 
Changes to Calculation of Earnings Credits for Clearing Balances 
Beginning with the maintenance period starting January 8, 2004, the Federal Reserve implemented changes 
to its method of calculating earnings credits on clearing balances.  In addition, it increased the frequency 
with which banks could change their clearing balance levels from once a month to each maintenance 
period.   
 
Changes to Authorization for Domestic Open Market Operations 
At its January 2004 meeting, the FOMC approved one change to the Authorization for Domestic Open 
Market Operations (Appendix A).  The change, which pertained to paragraph 3 of the Authorization, 
widened eligible participation in the Federal Reserve’s short-term repurchase facility (the RP pool) to 
include accounts held at the FRBNY pursuant to fiscal agency instructions from the Secretary of the 
Treasury.  Other investors already eligible for the RP pool include official foreign and international entities 
whose accounts are maintained at the Federal Reserve.    
 
 “Actual Availability” Accounting Procedures Implemented in Federal Reserve Check Processing 
As of March 9, 2004, the Federal Reserve employed “actual availability” accounting procedures for certain 




procedure of provisional credit accounting.  This new procedure aligned the Federal Reserve with private 
sector procedures by granting credit for checks only after they are collected.  It also reduced the level of 
Federal Reserve float.  Sections II and III of this report provide more detail. 
 
Expedited Release of FOMC Meeting Minutes 
At the December 14, 2004 FOMC meeting, the FOMC announced that it would expedite the publication of 
the minutes of its regularly scheduled meetings.  The FOMC decided to begin publishing the minutes three 
weeks after the date of the meeting, starting with the minutes for that meeting, which were published on 
January 4, 2005.  The minutes of the December 14 meeting noted that an accelerated release schedule 
would help market participants interpret economic developments and would provide a more timely context 
for policymakers’ public remarks.  FOMC meeting minutes had previously been made available on the 




II.   BANKS’ DEMAND FOR FED BALANCES 
In designing permanent and temporary open market operations, the Desk aims to satisfy banks’ demand for 
holding Fed balances on both a daily and a maintenance period-average basis.  Total demand can be broken 
down into two components:  the portion needed to meet all balance requirements and the portion held in 
excess of requirements. 
 
A.  Total Balance Requirements 
A bank’s total balance requirement is the average level of balances it must hold at the Federal Reserve over 
a two-week maintenance period to meet regulatory and contractual obligations.  The regulatory component 
is called the reserve balance requirement; it is the portion of reserve requirements not met with vault cash.  
As-of adjustments may also be applied to a bank’s position to affect the actual level of Fed balances that an 
institution would need to maintain to fulfill its total balance requirement.
2  The contractual component of 
total balance requirements is called the clearing balance requirement.  Reserve balance requirements, 
clearing balance requirements, and most as-of adjustments are known at the start of each maintenance 
period, which facilitates the Desk’s estimation of the demand for Fed balances.
3   
 
Total balance requirements retreated slightly over the course of the year, with clearing balances and reserve 
balance requirements only modestly changed (Chart 1).  The level of reservable deposits and thus reserve 
requirements rose early in the year against the backdrop of absolute low levels of short-term interest rates 
and an accordingly low nominal opportunity cost of holding funds in checking accounts.   
                                                           
2 An as-of adjustment is an off-balance-sheet adjustment to the reserve or clearing position of a depository 
institution (DI) to correct Reserve Bank accounting transaction errors, to correct DI errors (including 
deposit reporting errors), to recover float incurred by an institution, or to address other circumstances. 
















Chart 1:  Total Balance Requirements:  Required Reserve and
Clearing Balance Requirements (Maintenance Period Averages)





Effective January 8, 2004, the method for calculating earnings credits was changed, effectively reducing 
the earnings credit rate that banks received on contractual clearing balances.
4  In addition, the frequency 
with which banks could change their clearing balance levels was increased from once a month to once a 
maintenance period.  As a result, the average level of clearing balance requirements decreased and their 
inter-period volatility increased.  Hence, forecasting these requirements became more difficult, affecting 
medium-term planning of operations for the Desk.  Another change in the formula for computing the 
earnings credit rate became effective on January 6, 2005, further reducing the earnings credit rate. 
 
There is preliminary evidence that some banks may be adjusting clearing balances more frequently to better 
manage total balance requirements.  Actively offsetting changes in required reserve balances with changes 
in contractual clearing balances would reduce fluctuations in total required balances.  Though, wide swings 
in clearing balances would widen the Desk’s forecasting band for the overall demand for balances.   
 
A second change in 2004 that affected the demand for reserves to meet requirements was the System’s 
move to a new accounting procedure in check processing referred to as “actual availability.”  Starting 
March 9, 2004, Federal Reserve District Banks began providing banks reserve balance credit for some 
categories of checks only after the checks had actually been collected.  This change brought the System’s 
practices more closely in line with those of the private sector.  It also had the benefit of reducing the size of 
                                                           
4 For more information on the change, see http://www.frbservices.org/Accounting/pdf/amg.pdf, page IV-3. 
Also, the Board’s announcements can be found at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/meetings/2003/20031022/FinalBoardMemo2004Repricing.pdf  




as-of adjustments associated with check processing, thereby reducing forecast uncertainties for this 
component of demand for balances (Chart 2).   
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B.  Excess Balances   
Excess balances are balances held above and beyond the total level of balances an institution is required to 
hold.  Excess balances earn no interest and therefore represent a lost investment opportunity, but many 
institutions, especially the smaller ones, routinely hold them (Chart 3).  Demand for excess, while a small 
fraction of total balance demand, nonetheless represents an important component of the total demand for 
Fed balances, particularly because it can vary considerably from day to day.  The Desk accounts for the 
demand for excess balances—both on a daily and period-average basis—in its provision of balances. 

















Chart 3:  Excess Balances for Small and Large 







The mean level of excess balances was nearly unchanged from its level in 2003.  In general, there was less 
inter-period volatility in 2004 levels of period-average excess, partly accounted for by a decrease in the 
volatility of demand from large banks.  The intra-period pattern of excess demand, however, was 
noticeably different in 2004 (Chart 4).  In particular, some demand for reserves shifted from the final two 
days of the period to the initial days of the period.  This shift was partly explained by the calendar 
configuration in 2004, showing a greater number of high-payment-flow days early in the maintenance 
period (Table 2).
 5   
 
                                                           
5 High-payment-flow days are days on which banks are typically provided additional balances to meet their 
clearing demands, such as tax payment days, last business days of the month, and first business days of the 




































Chart 4:  Average Daily Levels of Excess Balances by
Day of Maintenance Period
Note: Excess is calculated using period-average levels of as-of adjustments. 
2001 data exclude period from 9/11/01 to 10/17/01.
 
 
Table 2:  Distribution of High Payment Flow Days Within the 14-day Maintenance Period
2 0 0 12 0 0 22 0 0 32 0 0 4
Before First Weekend (Days 1 to 2) 7 7 6 10
Middle Week (Days 5 to 9) 21 21 18 19
After Second Weekend (Days 12 to 14) 14 14 18 13
First Half (Days 1 to 7) 20 17 17 21
S e c o n d  H a l f  ( D a y s  8  t o  1 4 ) 2 22 52 52 1
T o t a l 4 24 24 24 2  
 
Higher levels of excess balances held early in the period were also likely attributable to the series of widely 
anticipated increases in the federal funds target rate in the middle of the maintenance period.  Overnight 
rates firmed and banks held higher-than-typical levels of balances in the days ahead of each expected target 
rate increase, evidencing banks’ increased demand for balances ahead of the target rate changes (see Box 
on Federal Funds Rate Behavior in Section V for a detailed description).   
 
Another change to the pattern of daily demand for balances was increased demand on the second Monday 
of the maintenance period, also evidenced by generally firmer rates on those days.  A pullback in demand 
on the second Tuesday, coupled with still-elevated demand on settlement Wednesday created a “barbell” 
pattern of demand for balances in the final three days of the period.  This shift forward in settlement day 
demand suggests that banks attempted to diminish their likelihood of holding unwanted excess balances by 
reducing their exposure to settlement day rate volatility. 
 




III.   AUTONOMOUS FACTORS AFFECTING THE SUPPLY OF FED BALANCES 
The supply of Fed balances is determined by the size of domestic financial assets, discount window loans, 
and the levels of various autonomous factors on the Federal Reserve's balance sheet.  Autonomous factors 
consist primarily of currency issued by the Federal Reserve (Federal Reserve notes) and also include assets 
and other liabilities on the Federal Reserve balance sheet over which the Desk has little or no control.  In 
2004, the net level of autonomous factors fell by $44.8 billion, a significantly greater dollar decline than in 
the two prior years, which translated to an equivalent drain on Fed balances (Chart 5). 
 
Chart 5:  Net Value of All Autonomous Factors and Federal 
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Developments in Federal Reserve Notes 
At approximately 90 percent of Federal Reserve liabilities, Federal Reserve notes are the dominant 
component of autonomous factors.  In 2004 Federal Reserve notes outstanding grew 4.8 percent, an 
increase of $33.2 billion, somewhat less than in 2003, and substantially weaker than in prior years.  As 
represented by the seasonally adjusted currency component of M1, currency growth was quite uneven over 
the year with very weak growth during the first quarter and at year-end, but with large gains in June and 
July (Chart 6).  Variations in the net volume of currency shipments to foreign destinations contributed 
substantially to this pattern, with heavy net inflows of currency to the United States during the first quarter 




Chart 6:  Growth of the Currency Component of M1 


















Developments in the Treasury Balance 
In recent years, the Treasury’s overall cash position, defined as funds held in the Treasury’s account with 
the Federal Reserve (Fed account) plus balances held in Tax and Loan (TT&L) note accounts at 
commercial banks, has exhibited a downward trend (Chart 7).  High TT&L capacity has largely removed 
the risk that the Treasury’s Fed balance might exceed its normal target due to insufficient TT&L capacity.  
However, the lower overall cash position has led to more occasions when the Treasury was not able to call 
in sufficient funds to bring its Fed account up to the usual $5 billion target.  This situation occurred on 12 
occasions in 2004, which was similar to 2003, but considerably more frequent than in prior years.    
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Developments in Other Autonomous Factors 
Autonomous factors other than currency also absorbed significant quantities of balances during 2004.  As 
noted in Section II, on March 9, Federal Reserve District Banks began to process some categories of check 
deposits using “actual availability” accounting procedures.  Under this new process, credit for such checks 
was not granted until the checks were collected from the issuing bank.  As a result, the quantity of check 
float on the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet declined sharply (Chart 8).  The average level of float has been 
about $50 million since the accounting change, compared with $420 million over the preceding 26 months.   
 




















During 2004 there was a $5.9 billion net increase in Federal Reserve capital accounts, which also drained 
balances.  In large part this rise was due to the impact of several mergers of commercial banks.  The 
mergers led to a revaluation of the acquired institution’s assets due to goodwill (an excess of the purchase 
price over the book value of assets).  The higher capital structure necessitated the purchase of additional 
Reserve Bank capital stock by acquiring banks, which was charged to the banks’ Fed accounts, thereby 
draining balances.  Moreover, at year-end the Federal Reserve raised its year-end level of surplus in parallel 
with the higher level of Federal Reserve paid-in capital.  The increase in surplus was funded by reducing 
the Reserve Banks’ earnings payments to the Treasury, which drained balances when the Treasury restored 
its balance with calls on commercial bank TT&L note accounts.  Finally, funds invested on an overnight 
basis for foreign central banks in the Federal Reserve’s RP pool increased sharply over the year, a gain of 
about $8 billion.   
 
Volatility and Predictability of Key Autonomous Factors 
The variability of autonomous factors, as measured by average absolute daily changes, decreased from the 
prior year and was accompanied by a substantial improvement in overall forecast accuracy (Table 3).  In 
particular, the variability of Federal Reserve float declined following the shift to “actual availability” 
accounting.  Also, float forecast accuracy improved as actual availability eliminated a major cause of 
elevated float levels during periods of inclement weather.  Variability of other autonomous factors during 
2004 was similar to earlier years; nonetheless forecast errors for the Treasury balance diminished, as 
improvements in data collection and Treasury cash management techniques showed through. 
 
Table 3: Daily Changes and Forecast Misses in Autonomous Factors
Average and maximum of absolute values
(millions of dollars) 2002 2003 2004
Average Max. Average Max. Average Max.
Daily Change
  Currency in circulation 874 3,015 858 3,128 890 3,510
  Treasury balance 903 8,622 745 3,552 739 4,272
  Foreign RP pool 500 3,502 629 4,325 584 5,219
  Float 756 4,484 1,059 6,704 788 5,724
  Net* 1,445 6,256 1,690 8,017 1,367 7,209
Daily Forecast Miss
  Currency in circulation 198 646 163 919 200 1,566
  Treasury balance 481 3,629 489 2,224 415 2,353
  Foreign RP pool 94 2,135 86 1,506 125 1,716
  Float 411 2,028 551 4,020 374 2,811
  Net* 721 2,557 803 3,805 654 3,920
Notes:
*Net reflects offsetting movements and forecast misses of all autonomous factors.  Forecast misses 




IV.   DOMESTIC FINANCIAL ASSETS & OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS 
A.  Use of Different Types of Open Market Operations 
The Federal Reserve maintains a mix of domestic financial assets to implement its monetary policy 
objectives.  The largest portion of the assets in its portfolio is composed of securities that are held outright 
for the purpose of matching longer-run movements in the level of net autonomous factor liabilities 
(discussed in Section III) over time (Chart 9).  The Federal Reserve also holds temporary assets, repurchase 
agreements (RPs), or issues temporary liabilities, reverse repurchase agreements (RRPs), to manage 
shorter-term swings in the level of net autonomous factors and in the demand for Fed balances.   
 
Chart 9:  Total Domestic Portfolio and Net Autonomous 
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Short-term temporary operations are defined as those operations with an original maturity of less than 13 
days.  In general, the Desk structures its other domestic financial assets such that routine temporary 
operations can accomplish needed daily adjustments to Fed balances.  Short-term RPs are arranged as 
needed (almost daily) to temporarily inject Fed balances.  Less utilized, RRPs are arranged when the level 
of Fed balances needs to be reduced temporarily, usually as a result of an unexpected reserve addition from 
unanticipated changes in the level of net autonomous factors. 
 
Long-term RPs, defined as operations with original maturities of 13 days or more, are a flexible tool to 




expected to last for a number of weeks or months.
6  Long-term RPs can also be used to bridge temporarily 
gaps between the level of net autonomous factors and the desired level of permanent holdings.  Moreover, 
long-term RPs provide a base level of balances that can be lowered as an alternative to arranging RRP 
operations on a sustained basis or selling securities outright from the domestic portfolio.  In 2004, routine 
long-term temporary operations continued to be arranged on a weekly basis, ordinarily on Thursdays, in the 
early morning when the financing market is more liquid. 
 
Lastly, permanent changes in the System Open Market Account (SOMA), via outright operations, are 
designed to offset permanent changes in the level of net autonomous factor liabilities.  Outright transactions 
are thus driven by long-term projections of the availability of balances.  These operations are executed in a 
manner that is intended to minimize financial market disruption. 
 
B.  Temporary Holdings and Operations 
Short-Term Temporary Operations 
Financial assets in the domestic portfolio are structured to include a layer of short-term operations that 
facilitate frequent market entry to offset short-lived changes to net autonomous factors.  As it has 
historically, the Desk determines the size of this layer after considering the System balance sheet’s inherent 
structural deficit position – and the continued need to inject balances – as well as operational considerations 
related to potential limits on the level of primary dealer participation at open market auctions. 
 
The desire for operational flexibility is reflected in the Desk’s activity in recent years, notably the 
prominence of overnight RPs.  A total of 192 overnight RPs were arranged in 2004 (including those 
spanning a holiday or a weekend) versus 179 in 2003 (Chart 10).  The average transaction size rose 
slightly, to $5.9 billion in 2004 from $5.3 billion in 2003.  This increase reflects the Desk’s strategic aim to 
leave greater scope for routine balance-adding operations.  Early in 2004, the Desk arranged its sole 
temporary draining operation of the year, combating seasonal softness in the federal funds rate.  The use of 
only one RRP in 2004 was low relative to the frequency in previous years, consistent with Desk’s strategy 
for short-term operations.   
 
                                                           
6   This definition has been in effect since late September 2003, when the maturity of regular weekly long-
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The daily level of net short-term operations outstanding (RPs minus RRPs) ranged from -$2.25 billion to 
$22 billion.  On a period-average basis, short-term operations outstanding ranged from $5.3 billion to $9 
billion, and were most elevated during the maintenance periods spanning the Labor Day holiday and 
following the April tax date.  By several measures, volatility in the level of short-term operations was 
reduced compared with the previous year, likely resulting from the Desk’s shift to a 14-day maturity (from 
28 days previously) for its long-term operations.  The 14-day structure provided greater flexibility to 
change the level of outstanding long-term RPs from one maintenance period to the next in response to 
movements in autonomous factors that were expected to influence supply levels over shorter intervals.  For 
the year as a whole, short-term temporary operations outstanding averaged $7.5 billion, in line with the 
average level in 2003 (Chart 11). 


















Long-Term Temporary Operations 
The Desk continued to aim informally for a base range of about $16 billion or so in total outstanding long-
term RPs.  Over the first half of the year, levels surrounded the base range, as seasonal factor movements 
were muted.  The Desk reduced long-term RP levels when drains on Fed balances attributable to 
movements in autonomous factors slowed considerably in the third quarter of 2004.  The total level of 
long-term RPs reached a low of $12 billion in 2004, similar to the low of $13 billion in 2003.  
 
Long-term RP levels rose above their typical base range for a considerable stretch from late August to late 
October (Chart 12).  Over that interval, a confluence of movements in autonomous factors, principally 
increases in the foreign RP pool and seasonal currency demand, contributed to elevated needs that were 
deemed temporary and also highly uncertain.  Reduced confidence about longer run forecasts of balance 
supply contributed to a greater reliance on temporary assets during this time period.  Only when the Desk 
had greater confidence about reserve supply and demand associated with its longer run forecasts, did it 
begin to replace temporary assets with outright holdings, thus reducing the level of long-term RPs to more 
typical levels ahead of the year-end currency cycle.  
















(a) Elevated to address seasonal factor movements







Similar to 2003, the Desk supplemented its regular weekly 14-day RPs with two additional long-term RPs 
(with 52-day and 13-day maturities) to help meet projected seasonal elevation in reserve needs around the 
year-end.  These additional long-term operations also helped reduce rollover risks associated with sizable 
14-day RP transactions.  The daily level of long-term RPs peaked at $24.25 billion around year-end, 
somewhat lower than $28 and $26 billion in 2003 and 2002, respectively, resulting from a less rapid pace 
of seasonal currency growth over the year-turn. 
 
Operational Performance 
Proposition levels for temporary operations were sufficient to cover the intended size of one-business-day 
transactions, often by a ratio around seven-to-one (Chart 13).  The Desk routinely conducted a sequence of 
overlapping short-term operations to layer in balances ahead of high-payment-flow days (such as quarter-
ends), when dealer participation on overnight RPs was anticipated to be low and balance needs were 
projected to be high.  Nonetheless, there was one instance of a near shortfall in available propositions 
relative to the Desk’s targeted amount for an overnight RP arranged on the eve of the November 10 FOMC 
meeting.  On that day, dealers reported expectations for an intra-day decline in money market rates, 
following several days showing this intra-day pattern in rates, thereby reducing the demand for morning 
financing.  Long-term RPs continued to be very heavily subscribed.  In 2004, the levels of propositions 
offered for 14-day RPs, which averaged $61 billion, were more than adequate to meet operational targets, 
averaging $8.4 billion for such transactions. 




Chart 13:  Bid-to-Cover Ratios by Operation Type in 














Average 6.30 6.94 8.99 7.86
*Diamonds each represent a single operation
 
 
Collateral Distribution of Repurchase Agreements 
The Desk solicited propositions across the entire pool of eligible collateral on all RPs arranged in 2004.  All 
RPs were arranged as three separate simultaneous operations (tranches), differentiated by the type of 
collateral eligible.  In the first tranche, only Treasury debt was accepted; in the second, direct federal 
agency obligations were also eligible; and, in the third, mortgage-backed debt was eligible in addition to 
the first two collateral types.  The Desk selected from propositions across the three tranches according to 
the attractiveness of bids relative to current rates in the financing markets for each particular class of 
collateral.  All RPs arranged in 2004 settled under the tri-party agreements established with two large 
clearing banks in 1999. 
 
The collateral distribution of outstanding RPs was heavily weighted toward Treasury securities in 2004, 
continuing a trend of growth in the share of collateral represented by Treasuries observed in recent years 
(Chart 14).
7   On average, Treasuries as a share of total RP collateral on long-term operations jumped to 85 
percent in 2004, compared with 67 percent in 2003 and 60 percent in 2002.  Treasury collateral accepted on 
short-term operations also increased in 2004, but to a lesser extent.  The upward trend in the share of 
Treasury propositions accepted reflects the primary dealers’ propensity to bid relatively more aggressively 
on the Treasury tranche of each operation, in light of a rise in the level of Treasury securities outstanding.  
In fact, the median spread between the highest bid and the Desk's benchmark rate on the Treasury tranche 
was 3 basis points, versus a spread of 1 to 2 basis points for both the agency and mortgage-backed tranches. 
                                                           
7 The Desk gauges relative value via a daily survey of the primary dealers' costs of funding.  Internal 
analysis showed that the Desk's survey was consistent with other available sources of prevailing market 

























Occasional, temporary spikes in agency and mortgage-backed collateral as a share of total accepted 
collateral resulted largely from technical factors in the Treasury market, such as a heightened scarcity of 
Treasury collateral that occurs around financial statement dates.   
 
C.  Permanent Holdings in the System Open Market Account and Outright Activity 
During 2004, the SOMA portfolio’s par value increased $51 billion to $717 billion, versus growth of $37 
billion in 2003 and $54 billion in 2002 (Chart 15).  Typically, growth in the SOMA’s domestic holdings 
has closely tracked that of Federal Reserve notes outstanding, the Federal Reserve’s largest liability.  
However, the portfolio’s growth in 2004 significantly exceeded that of Federal Reserve notes due to 
movements in other autonomous factors discussed in Section III. 
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To achieve a liquid and diversified portfolio structure without significantly distorting the pricing or 
liquidity of Treasury securities, SOMA purchases are conducted across the entire range of outstanding 
maturities, subject to the internal per-issue ownership limits set forth in July 2000.
8  The Desk continued to 
refrain from secondary market purchases of on-the-run Treasury securities, which have larger liquidity 
premia and are typically most susceptible to liquidity squeezes, so as to avoid adverse market impact. 
 
Secondary Market Purchases  
Growth of permanent SOMA holdings is achieved via secondary market purchases of Treasury securities, 
either through outright purchases from the primary dealers or through purchases from foreign central banks 
and other institutions that hold accounts with the Federal Reserve.  Outright operations with the primary 
dealers are designed to minimize disruptions to the market.  They are typically conducted mid-morning to 
ensure adequate liquidity and are scheduled on dates that do not feature major economic data releases or 
Treasury auctions in the sector being purchased.  Outright operations generally settle on the following 
business day, and therefore do not have a same-day impact on Fed balances.  In contrast, purchases from 
foreign central banks and other institutions are typically arranged for same-day settlement.  These 
purchases are notably smaller in size, and can occur on a daily basis when sell orders from these accounts 
are consistent with the SOMA portfolio guidelines and the need for Fed balances.       
 
In 2004, the relatively large drain in Fed balances from autonomous factors increased the need to expand 
the SOMA portfolio, compared with the prior year.  Additional holdings were purchased across the full 




consecutive year, due to the upward trend in issuance, there were no redemptions at Treasury auctions, 
which would have necessitated additional secondary market purchases.   
 
Increased Treasury supply and a greater frequency of outright operations resulted in a more even 
distribution of purchases across sectors in 2004 than had been the case in 2003.  The Treasury 
Department’s reintroduction of the 3-year note in the summer of 2003 and the increased frequency of 5-
year note auctions (to monthly auctions) have increased the SOMA’s capacity to purchase those maturities.  
SOMA portfolio investments remained concentrated in Treasury bills, which were purchased either from 
foreign central banks and other accounts or primary dealers.  Though, the Desk sought to manage the 
investment process between direct purchases from foreign central banks and other accounts and purchases 
from the dealers more closely.  As a result, only 39 percent of bill purchases came from foreign central 
banks and other accounts in 2004, a significant decrease from 72 percent in 2003 (Chart 16).  All purchases 
outside of bills were conducted though the Desk’s competitive bidding process with the primary dealers.   
 





















Purchases of Treasury notes and bonds continued to be segmented into separate tranches across different 
portions of the yield curve to facilitate efficient execution.  The selection of specific issues in each 
operation was based on the relative attractiveness of propositions and portfolio considerations.  In addition 
to remaining within the per-issue limits and avoiding on-the-run issues, the Desk avoided purchases that 
would be expected to cause a sizable redemption on any day within the foreseeable future, and it bought no 
issues in the secondary market that had less than five weeks remaining until maturity.  The Desk also 
                                                                                                                                                                             




refrained from purchasing issues that were trading with significant scarcity value in the RP market in order 
to avoid impairing the liquidity of individual securities that were in high demand at that time. 
 
While the SOMA holds large absolute amounts of Treasury securities, SOMA Treasury holdings remain 
below the internal SOMA guideline limits (Chart 17).  In total, the SOMA holds less than one quarter of the 
outstanding supply of Treasury securities (Chart 18).  In the domestic inflation-indexed securities market, 
the SOMA holds only 6.6 percent of the total outstanding supply, compared with 7.9 percent in 2003.  The 
decline in the SOMA’s proportion of indexed debt held relative to total outstanding supply largely reflects 
increased issuance in this sector, relative to purchases.   
 
Chart 17:  The SOMA's Holdings and Purchasable Room of 
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Chart 18:  The SOMA Portfolio's Holdings as a Percent of 
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The average outright operation size for the SOMA portfolio was little changed at $1.07 billion from $1.02 
billion in 2003, and the number of outright operations rose to 40 in 2004 from 22 operations in 2003 (Chart 
19).  The increase in frequency of operations was a result of the need to offset net autonomous factor drains 
to Fed balances and the Desk’s effort to better balance the relative amount of securities purchased between 
foreign central banks and other accounts and the dealers.  Measures of dealer appetite and competitive 
bidding indicated that outright operations in 2004 were quite successful.  The average par amount of 
propositions per outright operation was $9.82 billion, up from $8.1 billion in 2003, and the average 
proposition size increased to $77 million from $63 million last year.  Competition among dealer 
propositions appeared to increase, as the average of the yield range of accepted propositions for each 
security declined from 1 basis point to 0.6 basis points.  The Desk continued to maintain a low operation 
turnaround time, which encouraged more competitive bidding as it reduced price risk for dealers.  The 
average turnaround time of 4 minutes and 53 seconds was roughly equal to the 2003 turnaround time.   
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*There were 22 outright operations in 2003 compared to 40 in 2004
 
 
Primary Market Activity  
At Treasury auctions in 2004, the Desk continued to replace maturing securities by placing add-on bids for 
the SOMA equal to the lesser of (a) its maturing holdings on the issue date of a new security or (b) the 
amount that would bring the SOMA holdings as a percentage of the issue to the percentage guideline limits.  
On days in which two or more securities were auctioned, funds were rolled over based on guidelines.  
There were no primary market Treasury inflation-indexed securities (TIIS) purchases during 2004 or 2003, 
because on the days in which TIIS auctions took place, the SOMA had no maturing funds.  Also during 
2004, the Treasury called two bonds: the 9.125% 15-May 2009 and the 10.375% 15-Nov 2009.  The 
SOMA’s holdings of these two bonds were $1.405 billion and $1.075 billion, respectively.  The funds 
received from the callable Treasuries were reinvested according to portfolio guidelines at auction on the 
respective call dates. 
 
General Characteristics of Domestic Permanent SOMA Holdings at Year-End 
The average remaining maturity of the portfolio is kept relatively short under current guidelines, and 
holdings are laddered to guarantee a high degree of maturity liquidity over a one-year horizon (Chart 20).  
A combination of increased bill purchases and a concentration of coupon purchases in the shorter end of the 
curve yielded a decline in the average remaining maturity of the portfolio to 38.8 months at year-end from 
42.6 months at the end of 2003.  The SOMA portfolio’s average remaining maturity was shorter than that 




Total purchasable room for the SOMA portfolio increased to $293 billion from $255 billion last year.
9  
This was the first year that the SOMA held no Government agency obligations on an outright basis.
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Chart 20:  The SOMA's Holdings of Treasury Securities by Sector
(All Dollar Values in Billions)
 
 
SOMA Securities Lending Activity 
The FRBNY provides a temporary source of securities to the Treasury financing market via a securities 
lending program, to promote smooth clearing of Treasury securities.  The program offers securities for loan 
on an overnight basis from the SOMA portfolio in accordance with specified terms and conditions.
11  
Securities loans are awarded to primary dealers based on competitive bidding in an auction held each 
business day at noon eastern standard time.  To prevent securities lending operations from affecting 
overnight Fed balances, securities loans are collateralized with Treasury securities rather than cash. 
 
Effective June 30, 2004, coincident with the 25 basis point increase in the federal funds target rate to 1.25 
percent, the FRBNY raised the minimum fee for the SOMA securities lending program to 1.00 percent 
from 0.75 percent.  As the FOMC increased the federal funds target rate in 25 basis point increments to 
2.25 percent, the minimum fee was left unchanged at 1.00 percent. 
 
Average daily securities lending volume in 2004 increased $393 million to $1.8 billion.  This increase in 
lending largely reflected escalated volumes during the second and fourth quarters when an increased 
                                                           
9 Purchasable room is the maximum amount available for purchases without exceeding internal guidelines. 
10 The last agency security matured on 12/10/03. 
11 For terms and conditions of the Federal Reserve’s securities lending program, see 




scarcity of supply across issues in the financing market resulted in elevated settlement failures in the 
Treasury market (Chart 21).  The increase in volumes during the fourth quarter also might be partially 
attributable to the FRBNY's relatively attractive lending rate, as the spread between the minimum fee and 
federal funds target rate increased from 0.75 to 1.25 percent.  Lending volume averaged $2.2 billion during 
both the second and fourth quarters of 2004, compared with $0.9 billion during the second quarter of 2003 
and $1.7 billion during the fourth quarter of 2003. 
 
Chart 21:  Monthly Average Securities Lending Volumes and 
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For more information on fails data see  
www.newyorkfed.org/markets/pridealers_failsprimer.html 




V.  THE FEDERAL FUNDS MARKET AND DISCOUNT WINDOW CREDIT 
A.  Trading in the Federal Funds Market 
The FOMC raised the target federal funds rate from 1 percent to 2.25 percent in 2004, with the first 
tightening occurring on June 30.  Rate volatility in the federal funds market increased modestly in the 
second half of 2004, in contrast to the general downward trend that had been in place since 2001.  The 
median and average intraday standard deviation of the federal funds rate rose, as did the median and 
average trading range (Table 4).  Only 13 days showed 1 basis point of intraday standard deviation in the 
latter half of 2004 compared with 38 days in the first half of the year.
12 
 
Table 4: Fed Funds Rate Behavior 
Medians and Averages of Daily Values
(in basis points) 2001 2002 2003 H1 2003 H2 2004 H1 2004 H2
Measures of Intraday Volatility
Standard Deviation
Median 7 5 4 3 2 3
Average 9 6 5 5 3 6
Range
Median 56 31 28 25 16 31
Average 80 44 36 31 22 38
Deviations from Target
Absolute Deviations of Effective Rate from Target
Median 5 3 3 2 1 2
Average 7 4 4 4 2 4
Absolute Deviations of Morning Rate from Target
Median 0 -1 0 0 0 1
Average 1 0 1 1 1 1
Inter-day Volatility of the Effective -Target Rate Spread
Standard Deviation 9 5 1 1 3 6
Fed Funds Rate Behavior on High Payment Flow Days 
Deviations of Effective Rate from Target
Median 11 8 7 4 3 4
Average 12 6 9 7 4 4
Deviations of Morning Rate from Target
Median 16 9 9 9 5 7
Average 15 10 11 9 5 7
Standard Deviation
Median 8 7 6 8 4 5
Average 12 9 7 8 4 10
Note: High payment flow days include the first and last business days of the month, the settlement day of the U.S. Treasury's 
mid-quarter refundings, and tax dates;  2001 statistics exclude data from September 11 to October 3.  
 
                                                           




Other measures of rate volatility likewise showed some increase in the latter half of 2004.  The median 
absolute deviation of the effective and morning rates from the federal funds target rate increased in the 
second half of the year.  The same general pattern in rate volatility was also seen on high-payment-flow 
days.  However, the volatility of the federal funds rate, measured in any of these ways, remained quite low 
by historical standards.  For the year as a whole, the range between the daily high and low rates remained 
fairly narrow (Chart 25). 
 





































































































































































































































































Several factors have led to a secular downward trend in volatility in the funds market over the last few 
years.  The low target federal funds rate level lowered overall rate volatility as it led banks to have higher 
total balance requirements, as described in Section II.
13  Additionally, the historically low level of the target 
federal funds rate curtailed the potential for abrupt downward movements in the federal funds rate, while 
the primary credit facility reduced the likelihood of spikes higher.  Moreover, the Desk has steadily 
expanded the set of banking institutions for which reserve positions are collected, allowing for more precise 
estimation of period-average demand for excess Fed balances.   
 
                                                           
13 A higher federal funds rate raises the opportunity cost of holding contractual clearing balances and 




Conversations with market participants and other anecdotal evidence point to three primary explanations 
for the moderate increase in federal funds rate volatility in the latter half of 2004. 
 
1.  The level of the target federal funds rate has risen from 1 percent before the June FOMC meeting 
to 2.25 percent at year-end.   
 
2.  Unusual patterns in funding demand occurred in maintenance periods that included FOMC 
meetings with widely anticipated rate changes (as described later in the Box on Federal Funds 
Rate Behavior).  The five target rate increases this year were the first increases since December 
1999 (and the first target rate changes since June 2003).   
 
3.  Market participants quoted federal funds rates more frequently in fractions (such as 1/16
th and 
1/32
nd of a percentage point), as decimal trading (transactions occurring in hundredths of a 
percentage point) retraced a bit once the federal funds rate rose from its recent low of 1 percent, 
which might have contributed slightly to higher rate volatility. 
 
The median intraday standard deviation of the federal funds rate appears to have been strongly associated 
with the level of the target federal funds rate, declining until the second half of 2004 before turning around 
just as target rate increases began.  Even a scaled measure of federal funds rate volatility (the median 
intraday standard deviation divided by the target rate) rose in the second half of 2004, indicating that 
volatility actually increased more than proportionally with the rise in the target rate level (Chart 23). 
 
Chart 23:  Federal Funds Rate Median Intraday Standard 
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*Units of scaled deviation are basis points of intraday standard deviation divided by the target rate.
 




Analysis of measures of volatility over each month in 2004 sheds some more light on the source of the rise 
in rate volatility (Chart 24).  The rise in rate volatility was less pronounced when maintenance periods 
during which there were target rate changes were excluded.  There were 11 days in 2004 with an intraday 
standard deviation greater than ten basis points; 8 of these occurred in maintenance periods in which target 
rate changes were announced.  Even excluding these maintenance periods, volatility has however 
increased—the increase has been roughly proportional with the rise in the target federal funds rate.  
Measured relative to the target rate and excluding maintenance periods during which there were target rate 
changes, volatility was little changed in the second half of the year. 
  
Chart 24:  Measures of Federal Funds Rate
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The Desk aims to contain unusual volatility during maintenance periods that span FOMC meetings with 
widely anticipated rate changes.  The Desk has strived to balance its pace of provision of reserve balances 
against the risk of unusual volatility later in the maintenance period (further explained in the Box on 
Federal Funds Rate Behavior).  Banks may also have gained some experience in balancing a higher level of 
demand for reserve balances against the risk of unwanted excess reserve balances that could ultimately be 
more costly to them than the potential gain from expectational arbitrage. 




Box:  Federal Funds Rate Behavior around Target Rate Changes  
Against the backdrop of improved FOMC communication with markets, policy announcements have 
become more fully anticipated.  All five of the federal funds target rate increases in 2004 were broadly 
expected by market participants, and four of these changes occurred in the middle of reserve maintenance 
periods.
10  Before 2004, there were only a few mid-maintenance period target rate changes that could be 
characterized as widely anticipated.
11  Dynamics in demand for Fed balances and associated federal funds 
rate behavior around expected mid-period rate changes have posed challenges in the management of Fed 
balances to both the Desk and to market participants. 
 
The Desk broadly aims to diminish deviations in the federal funds rate from the target rate.  In balance 
management terms, the Desk aims to provide just enough total balances to allow banks to meet all of their 
requirements and precautionary demand for excess balances at a pace that addresses the daily pattern of 
demand.  If policy is expected to be tightened at a mid-period FOMC meeting, other things being equal, 
reserve managers have an incentive to buy or hold more balances in their Fed accounts earlier in the 
maintenance period, before any rate increase takes effect.  Faced with this shift in demand for Fed balances, 
the Desk has three general options for reserve management strategy.   
 
(1)  The Desk could provide balances at a “typical” pace.  The shift forward in demand for balances 
will allow policy expectations to show through to trading more fully in the federal funds market.  
Rates will move in the direction of the new target rate on the days in the maintenance period 
preceding the FOMC announcement.  
 
(2)  The Desk could supply an extremely high level of cumulative excess balances in the first week of 
the maintenance period, aiming to keep the federal funds rate at the old target.  This may imply 
satisfying a large share of banks’ period-need for reserve balances relatively early in the period 
and raises the odds that banks will end the period holding unwanted excess balances.  Following 
the FOMC meeting, the Desk would need to leave relatively low levels of daily balances, thereby 
raising the risk of banks being overdrawn and possibly borrowing from the discount window.  
Thus, this strategy could engender considerable volatility later in the maintenance period.  
 
(3)  The Desk could adopt a middle course, stepping up the pace of the provision of balances to 
mitigate the rise in the effective federal funds rate ahead of the FOMC meeting, but balancing this 
against the objective of limiting the subsequent rise in rate volatility.  The Desk has in fact leaned 
toward this “balanced” approach in the latter part of 2004. 
 
The daily effective federal funds rate moved partly toward the expected new target rate on the days in the 
maintenance periods preceding the FOMC announcement for all four mid-period target rate increases in 
2004.  Meanwhile, the days following these mid-period rate changes were characterized by somewhat 
elevated rate volatility, but probably less than would have been the case had the Desk aggressively acted to 
keep the federal funds rate precisely at the target ahead of the FOMC meeting. 
 
_________________ 
10 FOMC meetings typically occur on Tuesdays or Wednesdays, so it is most likely that a rate change 
occurs in the middle of a maintenance period or at the end.   
11 The unexpected component of a federal funds target rate change can be roughly measured by the change 
in the current month federal funds futures contract before and after a rate change is announced.  The next 
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B.  Discount Window Credit 
The year 2004 marked the second full year of operation for the primary and secondary credit facilities as 
sources of temporary liquidity for depository institutions.  The seasonal lending program remained 
unchanged.  The rates on the primary and secondary credit facilities were maintained at 100 and 150 basis 
points, respectively, above the federal funds target rate.   
 
The volume of borrowing remained low.  In 2004, primary credit borrowing averaged $42 million, 
compared with $35 million in prior year (Table 5).  Instances of borrowing remained low.  There were 5 
occurrences of primary credit borrowing in excess of $500 million in 2004 compared with 2 instances in 
2003.   
 
Table 5: Borrowing Trends
2001 *2001 2002 2003 2004
Daily averages in $ billions
Seasonal borrowing 73 73 92 63 110
Adjustment/Primary borrowing 323 78 54 35 42
Number of instances in which Adjustment/Primary borrowing exceeded…
$100 million 21 18 13 6 5
$500 million 11 8 6 2 5
* Excluding the period from 9/11/01 to 9/13/01  
 
There was only one case where trading in the brokered federal funds market occurred more than 100 basis 
points above the target rate in 2004 (due to a wire problem at a depository institution); thus there was little 




brokered federal funds rate rose more than 100 basis points above the target rate (following the power 
blackout), while in 2002 and 2001, there were 7 and 15 occasions, respectively.  Low levels of primary 
credit borrowing suggest that the Desk is continuing to meet banks’ demand with sufficient supply of Fed 















APPENDIX A:  AUTHORIZATION FOR DOMESTIC OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS  
At the January meeting the FOMC voted unanimously to amend the domestic authorization that would 
allow the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to place in the RP pool funds that are held pursuant to fiscal 
agency instructions from the Secretary of the Treasury.  The amendment involves additions to paragraph 3 
of the domestic authorization. 
 
Open market operations were conducted under the Authorization for Domestic Open Market Operations.  
The Authorization in effect at the end of 2004 is reprinted below:  
 
 
Authorization for Domestic Open Market Operations 
1. The Federal Open Market Committee authorizes and directs the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to 
the extent necessary to carry out the most recent domestic policy directive adopted at a meeting of the 
Committee: 
(a) To buy or sell U.S. Government securities, including securities of the Federal Financing Bank, 
and securities that are direct obligations of, or fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by, any 
agency of the United States in the open market, from or to securities dealers and foreign and 
international accounts maintained at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, on a cash, regular, or 
deferred delivery basis, for the System Open Market Account at market prices, and, for such 
Account, to exchange maturing U.S. Government and Federal agency securities with the Treasury 
or the individual agencies or to allow them to mature without replacement; provided that the 
aggregate amount of U.S. Government and Federal agency securities held in such Account 
(including forward commitments) at the close of business on the day of a meeting of the 
Committee at which action is taken with respect to a domestic policy directive shall not be 
increased or decreased by more than $12.0 billion during the period commencing with the opening 
of business on the day following such a meeting and ending with the close of business on the day 
of the next such meeting; 
 
(b) To buy U.S. Government securities, obligations that are direct obligations of, or fully 
guaranteed as to principal and interest by, any agency of the United States, from dealers for the 
account of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York under agreements for repurchase of such 
securities or obligations in 65 business days or less, at rates that, unless otherwise expressly 
authorized by the Committee, shall be determined by competitive bidding, after applying 
reasonable limitations on the volume of agreements with individual dealers; provided that in the 
event Government securities or agency issues covered by any such agreement are not repurchased 
by the dealer pursuant to the agreement or a renewal thereof, they shall be sold in the market or 
transferred to the System Open Market Account. 
 
(c) To sell U.S. Government securities and obligations that are direct obligations of, or fully 
guaranteed as to principal and interest by, any agency of the United States to dealers for System 
Open Market Account under agreements for the resale by dealers of such securities or obligations 
in 65 business days or less, at rates that, unless otherwise expressly authorized by the Committee, 
shall be determined by competitive bidding, after applying reasonable limitations on the volume of 
agreements with individual dealers. 
 
2. In order to ensure the effective conduct of open market operations, the Federal Open Market Committee 
authorizes the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to lend on an overnight basis U.S. Government 
securities held in the System Open Market Account to dealers at rates that shall be determined by 
competitive bidding. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York shall set a minimum lending fee consistent 
with the objectives of the program and apply reasonable limitations on the total amount of a specific issue 




Bank of New York may reject bids which could facilitate a dealer's ability to control a single issue as 
determined solely by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
3. In order to ensure the effective conduct of open market operations, while assisting in the provision of 
short-term investments for foreign and international accounts maintained at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York and accounts maintained at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as fiscal agent of the United 
States pursuant to Section 15 of the Federal Reserve Act, the Federal Open Market Committee authorizes 
and directs the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (a) for System Open Market Account, to sell U.S. 
Government securities to such accounts on the bases set forth in paragraph l(a) under agreements providing 
for the resale by such accounts of those securities in 65 business days or less on terms comparable to those 
available on such transactions in the market; and (b) for New York Bank account, when appropriate, to 
undertake with dealers, subject to the conditions imposed on purchases and sales of securities in paragraph 
l(b), repurchase agreements in U.S. Government and agency securities, and to arrange corresponding sale 
and repurchase agreements between its own account and such foreign, international, and fiscal agency 
accounts maintained at the Bank. Transactions undertaken with such accounts under the provisions of this 
paragraph may provide for a service fee when appropriate. 
4. In the execution of the Committee's decision regarding policy during any intermeeting period, the 
Committee authorizes and directs the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, upon the instruction of the 
Chairman of the Committee, to adjust somewhat in exceptional circumstances the degree of pressure on 
reserve positions and hence the intended federal funds rate. Any such adjustment shall be made in the 
context of the Committee's discussion and decision at its most recent meeting and the Committee's long-run 
objectives for price stability and sustainable economic growth, and shall be based on economic, financial, 
and monetary developments during the intermeeting period. Consistent with Committee practice, the 
Chairman, if feasible, will consult with the Committee before making any adjustment. 
 
 




APPENDIX B:  GUIDELINES FOR THE CONDUCT OF SYSTEM OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS 
IN FEDERAL AGENCY ISSUES 
 
The FOMC has established specific guidelines for operations in agency securities to ensure that Federal 
Reserve operations do not have undue market effects and do not serve to support individual issuers.  The 
guidelines are reprinted below. 
 
 
Guidelines for the Conduct of System Operations in Federal Agency Issues 
1.  System open market operations in Federal agency issues are an integral part of total System open 
market operations designed to influence bank reserves, money market conditions, and monetary 
aggregates. 
 
2.  System open market operations in Federal agency issues are not designed to support individual 
sectors of the market or to channel funds into issues of particular agencies. 
 
 
 